On this day in 1937, Japan initiated a full-scale invasion of
China, marking the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. This conflict is
often seen as the beginning of World War II in Asia. The invasion was triggered
by the Marco Polo Bridge Incident/ 盧溝橋事件,
where clashes between Chinese and Japanese troops escalated into a full-blown
war.
The war mainly, involved with China's government led by Chiang Kai-shek's KMT,
Japan, Russia, and later, the US. From 1934 to 1945, Mao Zedong/毛澤東
initially supported by Russia, and later, targeted on sabotaging Chaing
Kai-shek's governmental troops during fighting against Japan's invasion (began on July 7,
1937) and WWII.
In several official publications and speeches, Moa said that the biggest enemy
of him was not Japanese military strength, nor the hegemonic US power, but
Chiang's status and leadership. He openly expressed his gratitude to the
Japanese military and political figures who visited China in the 1950s and
1970s. Mao said that the Japanese invasion had united Chinese people and
allowed the CCP to win the Civil War.
A few days ago, the CCP regime officially published articles referring the
CCP's role during Japan's invasion (1937- 1945) as a 中流砥柱 which, in fact, was about a
manipulated dark side of human nature causing deaths in the above story. The
regime covers up the minimal contribution to the victory, even betrayed the
whole country's security to collaborate with Japan during the war. And the most
ludicrous event is that the regime claims the encircled 25,000 miles' Long
Escaping March to Yan'an of Shaanxi in 1935 as a part of the anti-Japan's
invasion! This article triggered me to write about "中流砥柱" - this "learning from saying" episode.
Winston Churchill once mentioned that history was written by the victors.
Whether it is convincing or not, Moa's regime does have existed for 76 years.
Again, this controversial event will be held on September 3 with a formal military parade pre-planned by the CCP regime (the current leader of the US. was invited to observe...) to commemorate the victory over Japanese Aggression, Fascism, and WW II.
According to the triangular data verification from the US. Japan, ROC, and the rest of relevant research institutes, Mao Zedong's small guerrilla groups adopted the 721 strategy (七二一方針, 又稱7分發展, 2分應付, 1分抗日, 是中國共產黨毛澤東, 在中國抗日戰爭中對其所控制部隊的作戰指示,) also known as 70% of the Internal Development, 20% of the Serendipitous Warfare, and 10% of Perfunctory Resistance against Japan, is the operational instructions by the rebel manager - Mao Zedong/毛澤東 who initially supported by Russia, and later, targeted on sabotaging Chaing Kai-shek's governmental troops during fighting against Japan (began on July 7, 1937) and WWII. In several official publications and speeches, Moa said that the biggest enemy of him was not Japanese military strength, nor the hegemonic US power, but Chiang's status and leadership. He openly expressed his gratitude to the Japanese military and political figures who visited China in the 1950s and 1970s. Mao said that the Japanese invasion had united Chinese people and allowed the CCP to win the Civil War.
Attached are some perspectives from the academia / 學界看法:
"劍橋大學方德萬 教授認為共軍是以保存實力為主。如中國通約翰·佩頓·戴維斯1945年4月對駐俄大使傅秉常所說，日軍來了共軍就跑，日軍走了共軍又佔領村莊。共軍保存實力以備將來爭權。共軍為了避免日軍報復而避免攻擊日軍，而因為解放區缺乏軍事價值，日軍對攻擊共軍也不感興趣。英國的情報來源則說共軍有可觀的軍事實力，但用於抗日上相當保留，因此推論延安與日軍高層應該存在某種勾結。
陳永發：國民政府這種指責，預先假定應付、擴大和抗日三事可以截然畫分，而相互之間是此長彼消，此消彼長的關係；中共為了擴大，故意犧牲抗日，而為了應付國民政府的反對和鎮壓，也故意減少抗日活動。對於中共，這一假定根本就是荒謬絕倫。他們並不諱言自己確實是在擴大實力，不過堅持擴大實力是為了抗日，以備有朝一日對日軍反攻，而由於國民政府不給中共「抗日自由」，尤其不容許中共擴大實力，所以中共必須應付。對中共而言，國民政府可以截然畫分為三的，其實就是抗日一件事情而已。
劉維開：所謂「一分抗日，二分應付，七分壯大自己」的說法，國府強調是來自中共內部情資，就中共在抗戰中的作為而言，的確是不介入日軍與國軍的「正面戰場」，以敵後游擊為主。既然是打游擊，當然要建立並鞏固根據地，並且趁機壯大自己實力，因此即使公文上沒有這句話，但整體策略的確是如此，不過「換成任何政治團體，那時大概也都是這麼做」。
美國史丹佛大學的范力沛教授（Lyman P. Van Slyke）的評論是有沒有這個指示並不重要，重要的是中共的確在執行這一策略。他認為七二一方針系捏造，這個問題涉及國民黨歷史的誠實問題。范力沛還說，在某些時刻某些地方，中共的實際行為接近於這種力量劃分。
已故旅美史家唐德剛認為：「毛氏是否說過這句話？這句話是不是國民黨特務對毛公的造謠？歷史家無徵不信，都應存疑。但是歷史家可以肯定的說，這是最高明的一着棋！國民黨的爛特務中，還沒有造這項謠言的智慧。……未及三年，區區的兩三萬人的小小「八路軍」，便發展成擁有五十萬槍兵的大軍了（讀者不妨參閱目前最新的史料，毛毛着《我的父親鄧小平》，頁四一八）。你能說毛主席的『七分發展，兩分應付，一分抗日』的訓辭是假的？歷史確實是這樣發展的嘛。」
中國北京大學歷史學系教授楊奎松認為：關於七二一方針，「以當時形勢與戰局變動之複雜，和毛、朱等對國共關係狀況及中日戰局變化了解之局限，是根本不可能預想和設計出來的。」，但楊教授也同意，到了1940年中共中央「確是將軍事發展放在了決定性的位置上，並且具體規劃了『在堅持游擊戰爭的總的任務下，掃除一切投降派頑固派的進攻，將整個華北直至皖北、江南打成一片，化為民主的抗日根據地，置於共產黨進步勢力管理之下，同時極大發展鄂中與鄂東』的大發展目標及其實際步驟。但是，這畢竟是1939年國共兩黨關係發生急劇改變之後的情況了，與1937年抗戰爆發初期的情況不能混為一談，更不能張冠李戴。」
Some Scholarly View:
Professor Fang Dewan of Cambridge University believes that "the communist army is mainly to preserve its strength. As John Peyton Davis told Fu Bingchang, the Chinese ambassador to Russia, in April 1945, when the Japanese army came, the communist army ran away, and the Japanese army left and the communist army occupied the village. The communist army preserved its strength in the future struggle for power. The communist army avoided attacking the Japanese army in order to avoid retaliation from the Japanese army, and because of the lack of military value in the liberated areas, the Japanese army was not interested in attacking the communist army. British intelligence sources said that the communist army had considerable military strength, but it was quite reserved for anti-Japanese use, so it was inferred that there should be some kind of collusion between Yan'an and the Japanese military leadership."
Chen Yongfa: "The Nationalist Government's accusation presupposes that the three matters of coping, expanding, and resisting Japan can be clearly divided, and that there is a relationship between each other. In order to expand, the CCP deliberately sacrificed anti-Japanese resistance, and in order to cope with the opposition and repression of the Nationalist government, it also deliberately reduced anti-Japanese activities. For the CCP, this assumption is simply absurd. They did not shy away from saying that they were indeed expanding their strength, but they insisted that the purpose of expanding their strength was to resist Japan and prepare for a counteroffensive against the Japanese army one day, and because the Nationalist Government did not give the Chinese Communists the freedom to resist Japan, especially the Chinese Communists were not allowed to expand their strength, the Chinese Communists had to deal with it. As far as the CCP is concerned, the Nationalist Government can be divided into three parts, which is actually just an anti-Japanese affair."
Liu Weikai: "The so-called saying that 'one point to resist Japan, two points to deal with, and seven points to strengthen oneself' is emphasized by the government to come from the internal intelligence of the Chinese Communist Party, and as far as the CCP's actions in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression are concerned, it is indeed not involved in the 'frontal battlefield' between the Japanese army and the Taiwan army, and mainly focuses on guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. Since it was a guerrilla war, of course, it was necessary to establish and consolidate base areas and take advantage of the opportunity to strengthen itself, so even if this was not mentioned in the official document, the overall strategy was indeed the same, but 'it was probably the same for any political group at that time.' "
Professor Lyman P. Van Slyke of Stanford University commented that "it does not matter whether there is such a directive or not, but that the CCP is indeed carrying out this strategy. He argued that the 721 policy was a fabrication, and that the issue involved the honesty of the Kuomintang's history. Fan Lipei also said that at certain moments and in some places, the actual behavior of the CCP is close to this division of power."
The late American historian Tang Degang said: "Did Mao say this? Is this sentence a rumor spread by the Kuomintang spies about Mao Gong? Historians should be suspicious if they do not believe it. But historians can say with certainty that this is the most brilliant move! Among the bad spies of the Kuomintang, they have not yet had the wisdom to create this rumor. …… In less than three years, the small 'Eighth Route Army' of 20,000 or 30,000 men had grown into an army of 500,000 spearmen (readers may refer to the latest historical sources, Mao Mao's "My Father Deng Xiaoping", p. 418). Can you say that Chairman Mao's precept of 'seven points of development, two points of coping, and one point of resistance to Japan' is false? That's how history goes."
Yang Kuisong, a professor at the Department of History at Peking University in China, believes that "with regard to the July 21 policy, 'given the complexity of the situation and changes in the war situation at that time, and the limitations of Mao's and Zhu's understanding of the state of the Kuomintang-Communist Party relations and the changes in the Sino-Japanese war situation, it was impossible to predict and design it.' However, Professor Yang also agreed that by 1940, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had indeed placed military development in a decisive position, and had specifically planned the great development goal and practical steps of 'sweeping away all the attacks of capitulation diehards under the general task of persisting in guerrilla warfare, and turning the whole of North China up to northern Anhui and Jiangnan into a democratic anti-Japanese base area, under the management of the progressive forces of the Communist Party, and at the same time greatly developing central and eastern Hubei provinces.' However, after all, this was the situation after the drastic change in the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in 1939, and it cannot be confused with the situation in the early days of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression in 1937, let alone the situation of the first day of the Anti-Japanese War.' "
方德萬. War and
Nationalism in China: 1925-1945. Abingdon: Routledge. 2003年9月2日:
58–59頁. ISBN 978-0415514996.（英文）
《學者：當年共軍打游擊 壯大自己》 （頁面存檔備份，存於網際網路檔案館），聯合報，2010.09.05
United States War Department. Slyke, Lyman P. Van , 編. The Chinese
Communist Movement. Stanford University Press. 1968: 101–102 [2014-05-02]. ISBN 978-0-8047-0639-1. （原始內容存檔於2014-07-06）.
唐德剛：〈毛澤東簡傳要義評述〉
楊奎松：〈抗戰初期中共軍事發展方針變動的史實考析——兼談所謂「七分發展，二分應付，一分抗日」方針的真實性問題〉
